

relegated to collections; the Mardi Gras recurs, but flows afresh like the proverbial river; a digital archive remains as long as its servers are maintained, but fades into invisibility; and a traveling exhibition of boots is retired. Participatory history can also be monumental, as a visit to any park with a statue erected by public subscription or a plaque over a time capsule interred by local students will attest.

The book's inspiration, however, is to capture commemorations that bring together mass participation and iconographic resources in the service of public remembrance (p. 17), yet which act like Omar Khayyám's moving finger. The act of participation generates its own meanings. The display of military boots forms "a plea for its own obsolescence" (p. 115), both because it unfolded as the wars dragged on and because its very purpose was to provoke and hasten an end to those wars.

This is a dense yet engaging contribution, liberally interspersed with illustrations. One regret is that the economics of academic publishing did not permit sharp, let alone color, images. (A small regret: the memorials described are significant enough for images of them to be searchable online). Throughout, *Popular Memories* also displays an eclecticism of sources, drawing on classical literature, fellow scholars of rhetoric and performance, and, of course, contemporary culture.

The focus is almost entirely on the United States, yet the studies are part of the lingua franca of the liberal West, and the theory cited speaks broadly. An interesting future project would be to examine how organizers of memorials are learning techniques internationally. Haskins notes how the military boots gesture to the NAMES quilt, whose individual patches commemorated AIDS victims. Intriguingly, it also reminds this reader of "The Sea of Hands," an Indigenous-Australian project begun in 1997, which toured thousands of colored plastic hands, planted in public spaces and festooned with messages of racial reconciliation.

Ultimately, Haskins's is an optimistic voice. If "citizenship is a relationship amongst strangers," she reasons, then popular commemorations can navigate the divide between a privatized and fractured culture, by allowing participants to collectively produce memorials and events that mediate "between private remembrance and stories of nationhood" (p. 118).

**Social Organization and the Authoritarian State in China.** By Timothy Hildebrandt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013. 234p. \$99.99 cloth, \$32.99 paper.  
doi:10.1017/S1537592716000815

— Daniela Stockmann, *Leiden University*

In most democracies, nongovernmental organizations are thought to be an important indicator for the development of civil society and one of the foundations for democracy.

In *Social Organization and the Authoritarian State in China*, Timothy Hildebrandt reveals how the context within social organizations operate in an authoritarian state like China creates a system in which social organizations simultaneously help to address important social problems while they also assist the government in implementing its policies.

Based on extensive fieldwork in Kunming, Chengdu, and Beijing, Hildebrandt provides insights into how leaders of social organizations within three issue areas operate within narrow opportunity structures that lead them operate within the system rather than developing opposition to the political status quo. Environmental protection groups, HIV/AIDS prevention groups, and gay and lesbian groups need to adapt to changing political, economic, and personal opportunity structures that impede their progress and threaten their long-term viability.

Drawing on the literature on social movements, Hildebrandt defines opportunities as policy windows that the state can impede or facilitate by narrowing or widening them, respectively. Political opportunities are created by the various policy decisions and changing government interests at different levels of administration within China's hierarchical political structure, economic opportunities constitute the ability to attract funding resources and mechanisms, and personal opportunities are composed of the individual relationships that leaders build with government officials. The book is organized around these three parts of the overall opportunity structure, and compares tactics of these three groups within each opportunity structure.

Qualitative interviews and an online survey with leaders of social organizations reveal a system in which political opportunity structures are drastically and rapidly changing, financial resources are limited, and personal relationships are not institutionalized. Social activists adapt to this system because otherwise they would face negative response from government officials. Social activists rarely experience government interference or repression because they impose self-control as they adapt to changing circumstances and work within the system. The result is a weak civil society that bolsters existing structures rather than challenging them more profoundly. Non-governmental organizations act as "social service providers" (p. 167) that assist the state in addressing social problems, thus increasing the legitimacy of the state while also providing an outlet for social participation that does not threaten the status quo.

This provocative conclusion is well argued. The book highlights the broader patterns while at the same time not losing attention to detail: Quotes from eighty in-depth interviews tell an engagingly-written story that is further substantiated with quantitative results from an expert survey with ninety-five leaders of social organizations.

Because no reliable accounts of nongovernmental organizations exist in China, the expert survey serves as an expansion of qualitative interviews that extend the book's main regional focus on Kunming, Chengdu, and Beijing to twenty-two provinces and municipalities. Hildebrandt carefully makes claims that can be substantiated with evidence while also not losing sight of limitations entailed in the research design.

Theoretically, the book challenges a common assumption in research on civil society and state-society relations. Most importantly, the book describes the relationship between the authoritarian state and society as codependent rather than zero-sum. In the China field, a number of scholars conducting their fieldwork around the same time have come to similar conclusions (see, for example, James Reilly (2012) *Strong State, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China's Japan Policy*; Robert Weller (2008) "Responsive Authoritarianism." In B. Gilley & L. Diamond (Eds.), *Political Change in China: Comparisons with Taiwan*). However, the assumption that strong society will weaken the authoritarian state is less accepted beyond research on China. Counterintuitively, the book therefore describes one potential opposition group (among others) as those that have strong ties to the central government (as opposed to local government) receiving donations from international community groups.

Other contributions constitute the emphasis on leaders of social organizations. In the literature on social movements, research on opportunity structures is often criticized for its lack of agency, which the book addresses by placing social activists at the center, explaining their strategies within a changing opportunity structure. Researchers on authoritarianism may also find parts of the book intriguing that link the opportunity structures to political activism: Hildebrandt argues that a lack of transparency and the often striking differences between political rhetoric and actions on the side of the authoritarian state create a certain amount of uncertainty among social activists. As a result, how social activists *perceive* the opportunity structure is particularly important in explaining strategies and tactics of social organizations.

Having spent some time in Washington working for the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, the book also addresses practical implications for the international community with respect to their funding of non-governmental organizations in China. Here, Hildebrandt takes a critical stance towards existing programs that often focus on populations easiest to reach implementing the cheapest methods, rather than reaching the most needful populations using the best practices. The book also provides insights into the difference between legally registered organizations that can be more easily funded by foreign donors, and unregistered organizations that sometimes can work more effectively or may have more potential for bringing about political reform.

The mix of theory, detail, and insight make this an important book. Researchers of social movements, civil society, and authoritarianism as well as international donors and policy-makers will enjoy reading this book.

### **Trust and Fear in Civil Wars: Ending Intrastate**

**Conflicts.** By Shanna Kirschner. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014. 200p. \$80.00.

doi:10.1017/S1537592716000827

— Sarah Zukerman Daly, *University of Notre Dame*

This book makes an important contribution to the study of war duration and conflict resolution. It asks: Why are some civil wars so difficult to resolve while others end quickly?

A dominant explanation for war duration centers on the commitment problem. Specifically, intrastate wars will be difficult to end and lasting agreements elusive when any negotiated deal reached today to end the violence may not be in the interests of the actors to uphold in the future, and thus, fearing the consequences of defection, both sides will prefer to continue to fight (e.g., see James D. Fearon, "Rationalist Explanations for War," *International Organization* 49 [no. 3, 1995]: 379–414; Barbara F. Walter, "The Critical Barrier to Civil War Settlement," *International Organization* 51 [no. 3, 1997]: 335–64). *Trust and Fear in Civil Wars* adds nuance to this theory of war duration by showing that the commitment problem is not constant across belligerent groups but, rather, varies in important ways because mistrust itself varies. This provides an important insight: Combatants are not equally likely to assume that their enemy will slit their throat if they surrender their weapons (p. 3). Additionally, Shanna Kirschner shows that warring factions not only fear that their adversary will renege on any peace deal but also fear the consequences of this breach of the deal. They weigh both the probability and the costs of defection.

According to Kirschner, these calculations are informed by assessments of the adversary's reputation, specifically its execution of atrocities, policies of discrimination, and history of conflict. The predicted costs of a broken settlement are also influenced by individuals' identifiability: their ability to "pass" as a member of another group and thus their vulnerability to being targeted in the event of a breached peace bargain. She argues that wars will be prolonged and difficult to resolve when parties do not trust each other to keep the peace and actors fear deadly repercussions should the accords break down. In contrast, where actors have mitigated levels of mistrust and anticipate lower costs to war recurrence, conflicts should be easier to resolve and therefore briefer in duration.

The book develops and evaluates this argument over the course of seven chapters. After laying out the theory