Online Appendix

Daniela Stockmann, "Race to the Bottom: Media Marketization and Increasing Negativity toward the United States in China," *Political Communication*, 28:3, 2011, pp. 268-290.

Beijing Area Studies, 1998-2004.
The BAS has been conducted annually since 1995 by the Research Center on Contemporary China (RCCC) at Peking University, sampling about 1000 Beijing residents. In 2004 the response rate was 56.1% (n= 617).[1] Sampling was done according to probability proportional to size (PPS), a form of stratified random sampling. Lists of registered Beijing residents (with Hukou) are issued every year, but exclude migrant workers. The polling of the BAS involves lengthy face-to-face interviews with respondents conducted by trained graduate students. The survey data was double-checked several times before release.

Question Wording and Coding of Variables:
Positivity toward the United States: "Which newspapers (on this list) have you read yesterday / the day before yesterday / within the past 7 days?"
Cadre: Dummy variable based on profession.

Family Income: Middle Class ranges between RMB 800 and 2,900, upper middle-class between RMB 3,000 and 10,000. Based on Johnston (2004).

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[1] Due to the growing number of polls conducted by market research companies, response rates are in decline.

Additional Figures and Tables

**Figure OA1. Rise and Decline of Popular Newspapers in Beijing. Source: CTR Market Research.[2]**

Figure OA2. Decline and Rise of Popular Newspapers in Chongqing. Source: CTR Market Research.

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[2] Data points from 1982 and 1996 are from (Beijing Academic Association of Journalism; Yu, 2000a), respectively. After 1996 data are taken from CTR market research, which is based on PPS random sampling conducted face-to-face in local dialect. Average response rate was 65 %.

Table OA1. Media Content as a Prisoner's Dilemma. Source: Modified based on Hamilton (1998).

		Nonofficial Paper	
		Less Negativity	*More Negativity*
Official Paper	*Less Negativity*	X,X	X-B, X+B
	More Negativity	X+B, X-B	X-C, X-C

Table OA2. Likelihood to read a Newspaper among Cadres and Readers of Interest to Advertising Companies. Source: BAS 2004.

Paper Audience	*People's Daily*	*Beijing Daily*	*Beijing Evening News*	*Beijing Youth Daily*	*Beijing Times*
Cadres	20.41 % (10)	30.61 % (15)	55.10 % (27)	32.65 % (16)	14.29 % (7)
Middle Class [a]	12.41 % (34)	13.14 % (36)	50 % (137)	9.85 % (27)	7.66 % (21)
Upper Middle Class [b]	10.94 % (28)	19.53 % (50)	53.91 % (138)	32.03 % (82)	8.59 % (22)

[a] Measured based on family income between RMRB 800 – 2,900. Coding based on Johnston (2004).
[b] Measured based on family income between RMRB 3,000 – 100,000. Coding based on Johnston (2004).

Table OA3. Change in Positivity toward the US among Cadres and Readers of Interest to Advertising Companies. Source: BAS 1998, 2002.

Year Audience	Positivity 1998 *Average (s.d.)*	Positivity 2002 *Average (s.d.)*	Change *2002-1998 (s.e.)*
Cadres	56.23 (25.21)	46.88 (26.93)	-9.35 (6.81)
Middle Class [a]	60.95 (23.39)	52.06 (24.7)	-8.89*** (1.81)
Upper Middle Class [b]	63.08 (24.82)	52.58 (24.34)	-10.5*** (2.54)

p-value * p<0.1;   ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01;

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[a] Measured based on family income between RMRB 800 – 2,900. Coding based on Johnston (2004).
[b] Measured based on family income between RMRB 3,000 – 100,000. Coding based on Johnston (2004).

Table OA4. Changes in the Tone of News Reporting Over Time. Source: USCATA.[3]

| | *Dependent Variable* **Tone of News Reporting about the US** | | | |
| | Coefficient (s.e.) | | | |
	Among All Articles		*People's Daily*	*Beijing Evening News*
People's Daily	0.257***	--	--	--
	(0.088)			
People's Daily*2003	0.067	--	--	--
	(0.103)			
2003	-0.139**	-0.197***	-0.308***	-0.171*
	(0.066)	(0.074)	(0.117)	(0.096)
China and the US	0.451***	0.374***	0.139	0.484***
	(0.053)	(0.075)	(0.118)	(0.099)
China and the US * 2003	--	0.157	0.398**	0.061
		(0.102)	(0.156)	(0.135)
Politics	-1.381***	-1.192***	-1.101***	-1.530***
	(0.189)	(0.185)	(0.275)	(0.26)
Sensitivity Over Time	-0.896***	-0.321*	-1.090***	-0.626*
	(0.222)	(0.179)	(0.279)	(0.355)
Length	1.070*	1.074*	1.241*	0.778
	(0.569)	(0.57)	(0.727)	(0.892)
Constant	0.404***	0.398***	0.806***	0.410***
	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.145)	(0.092)
N	2,272	2,272	945	1,327
R2	0.07	0.07	0.07	0.08

p-value * $p<0.1$;   ** $p< 0.05$;   *** $p< 0.01$;

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[3] Results remain robust when deleting outliers and when including further control variables. Results can be retrieved from the author.

Measurement Validity Testing of Sanctioned and Nonsanctioned Topics

To test the validity of my measures for non-sanctioned and sanctioned topics I rely on three lists of keywords frequently censored by website administrators.[4] These lists differ in degree of sensitivity and contain terms referring to specific names and events associated with, for example, the 1989 student demonstrations, as well as general topics, including such terms as, for example, "human rights," "democracy," or "freedom." Articles that mentioned a highly sensitive keyword were coded as three, articles that mentioned a sensitive keyword received a two and articles with references to somewhat sensitive keywords were coded as one; zero indicates that none of the keywords were mentioned in the article.

As expected, Table OA5 illustrates that issue sensitivity increases as article become more relevant to China and particularly Chinese officials involved in foreign policy-making. To simplify presentation of results, I present cross-tables here of average sensitivity in articles that do or do not mention political leaders (including a list of names of American, international, and Chinese policymakers) and that do or do not mention China in addition to the US. Both papers generally follow the same logic when publishing these articles: as reporting becomes more relevant to political leaders, they become more sensitive; and if they mention China in addition to the United States, sensitivity increases. Articles were most likely to be sensitive when related to China and mentioning political leaders.

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[4] Many thanks to Xiao Qiang, the head of Berkeley's China Digital Times Project, and Jonathan Hassid for sharing this list.

Table OA5. Average Sensitivity of Articles on the United States. Source: USCATA.

		People's Daily	Beijing Evening News	
		Average (s.d.)	Average (s.d.)	Total N
Political Leaders	*China and US*	0.7 (0.72)	0.51 (0.57)	361
	Only US	0.46 (0.57)	0.32 (0.49)	499
No Political Leaders	*China and US*	0.38 (0.65)	0.19 (0.43)	833
	Only US	0.25 (0.6)	0.18 (0.41)	587
Total N		953	1327	2280

Note that nonsanctioned topics (those that do not mention China or political leaders) can, in fact, be highly relevant to politics. For example, articles that reported about Iraq in 2003 reported about 50 percent of the time about politicians without mentioning China, and 22 percent of the time only about the US without mentioning any political leader.[5] This was consistent with my interviews with media practitioners conducted in 2004 and 2005, which described the war on Iraq as not sensitive (Stockmann, In press). Topics related to politics but not relevant to the Chinese position in foreign politics turn out to be nonsanctioned topics. Overall, sensitivity of a particular topic increases as it becomes more relevant to China, particularly Chinese officials.


[5] For frequencies see Table OA7.

Confrontational Events and Increase in Negativity toward the US

As in the content analysis of newspaper reports, I rely on Yoshikoder to compare the tone of HR reports over time as this software can be used in both, Chinese and English. To assess tone I rely on the General Inquirer (GI) dictionary of positive and negative valence terms (Stone, Dunphy, Smith, & Ogilvie, 1966); the Chinese dictionary, also used in the content analysis of news reporting, constitutes of a translation of the English version of GI terms in addition to keywords of colloquial language used on the internet (Ku, Wu, Lee, & Chen-Hsin-hsi, 2005). Since little colloquial language is used in the Chinese reports, these dictionaries should lead to roughly similar measures for positive and negative terms across languages. To compare the development of tone, I rely on the same measure as in the content analysis of news reporting.

Figure OA3 reveals that patterns of tone in Chinese and American human rights reports are essentially mirror images of each other. The x-axis displays the year of the situation which the HR report describes (the HR report itself is published in the following year); the y-axis displays average tone regarding the other country in each HR report.[6] When comparing how tone changes over time, we detect that Chinese HR reports become more positive when American HR reports become more negative, and reverse; only 2008, the year of the Beijing Olympics, breaks this pattern.

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[6] As evident in Figure OA3, American HR reports are generally more positive than Chinese HR reports. This pattern may be a feature of differences between the English and Chinese language when talking about human rights abuse.

Figure OA3. Comparison of Tone between American and Chinese Human Rights Reports, 1999-2008.


Since the Chinese HR report is published directly in response to the American HR report of the same year, these developments do not show any signs of retaliation.[7] Instead, they strengthen the conclusion that Chinese HR reports are formulated based on concerns about internal developments that may filter China's reaction to the content of American HR reports in the same or previous years. Similarly, marketized media in China are likely to primarily take into account audience demands when covering international news.

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[7] Chinese HR reports are published after the American HR report has been published; often the Chinese HR report specifically refers to the American HR report of the same year. The bivariate OLS regression coefficient of tone regarding China in American HR reports on tone regarding the US in Chinese HR reports is -0.26 (s.e. = 0.23). If tone regarding China in US HR reports is one year lagged, it is 0.26 (s.e. = 0.23); if lagged two years, it is 0.33 (s.e. = 0.22); If tone regarding China in US HR reports is assumed to accumulate between the report of the previous year and the report of the same year, the bivariate OLS regression coefficient is 0.01 (s.e. = 0.17).

Official Position on the US taken by Spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry

To provide further evidence that the Chinese government intends to "massage" Chinese sentiment towards the United States I collected all public statements made by the spokesman of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOF) published on the Ministry's website. [8] As in the content analysis of newspaper reports and HR reports, I rely on Yoshikoder to analyze changes in the tone of statements regarding the United States in the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Measurement is consistent with my content analysis of news reporting.

Figure OA4. Tone on the United States in Public Statements by the PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2000-2009.[9]

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
[8] Statements were included if they were made by the spokesperson of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and mentioned the United States at least twice; data collected from the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjb/adsearch.jsp, accessed January 21, 2011.
[9] Data for 2000 does only reflect the period from March onwards since statements of earlier months (if they were made) were not available on the website of the Ministry at http://www.mfa.gov.cn/wjb/adsearch.jsp, accessed January 21, 2011.

Results demonstrate that MOF statements become more positive over time up until about 2005. Figure OA4 displays the results of the content analysis of MOF statements, whereby the x-axis indicates the year in which the statement was made and the y-axis the average tone among all statements made per year. Between 2000 and 2005 the ratio of positive to negative valence words increased by about 71%; this trend was only interrupted between 2002 and 2003, when the ratio of positive to negative valence words decreased by about 35%. This drop in tone is related to the Chinese government's opposition to Iraq, though the war on Iraq does not fully capture the drop in tone in 2003. In 2003 about 70 percent of MOF statements mentioned Iraq in addition to the United States. Yet even when controlling for the relevance of the MOF statements to Iraq, tone regarding the US decreased by about 22% in 2003, even when the statements was unrelated to Iraq; as the statement became more relevant to Iraq, tone dropped further, by an additional 20%, though these results are not statistically significant (see Table OA6).

The war on Iraq negatively affected the official position of the Chinese government towards the United States. *However, when comparing the year 2000 and 2003, the years closest to those selected for content analysis of news reporting, the ratio of positive to negative valence words still increased by about 20%; even after taking into account the negative effect of the war on Iraq, tone in MOF statements improved compared to the late 1990s/early 2000s.*

Table OA6. OLS Regression Results of Relevance to Iraq on Tone of Statements by the Spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Source: USCATA.

	Dependent Variable **Tone regarding the US**
	Coefficient (s.e.)
Date [x]	0.01***
	(0.003)
Date Squared	-0.00***
	(0.00)
Year 2003 [y]	-0.22
	(0.21)
Iraq [y]	-0.05
	(0.1)
Iraq * Year 2003	-0.2
	(0.26)
Constant	-96632.61***
	(25984.19)
N	614
R2	0.04

p-value * p<0.1;   ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01;

[x] Coded as YearMonthDay; for example, January 4, 2001 is coded as 20010104.
[y] Dummy variable.

The Role of the War on Iraq

The analysis of statements by the spokesperson of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs has shown that the tone of official statements between 1999 and 2003 improved rather than deteriorated, though the Chinese expressed more criticism in 2003 and particularly with respect to the war on Iraq compared to 2002. This provides further evidence that the year of 2003 was not characterized with the same degree of tension between China and the United States as 1999, the year of the embassy bombing (see also Yan & Qi, 2009). Therefore, an increase in negative news reporting over time is unlikely to result from direct actions undertaken by the American government against China.

Instead, as a nonsanctioned topic, reporters used the war on Iraq to express criticism of American foreign policy. My point here is simply that reporters used the opportunity to express their criticism in the context of the war on Iraq, while they had to restrain themselves in 1999, despite greater tension with the United States. It is hard to imagine Chinese feeling *more* anger against the United States due to its invasion of Iraq in 2003 than in 1999 when several Chinese were killed in Belgrade, and which was interpreted by the Chinese press as an intended action by the US government exercised during a NATO air strike.[10] Therefore, increase in negativity due to reporting on Iraq is unlikely to be caused by the Chinese reaction to how the US behaves towards China, but reporters have searched for strategies to express criticism in a fashion that is not sanctioned by the Propaganda authorities, and the war on Iraq provided such an opportunity.

If this is true, Iraq should generally follow into a category of news stories that is less sensitive. Indeed, articles on Iraq generally do not mention China (70 percent); only

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[10] For Chinese reactions to the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade as well as the war on Iraq see (Zhao, 2002; Johnston & Stockmann, 2007; Weiss, 2008; Wang, 2010).

about 30 percent are related to both China and the US.[11] This is even the case when considering relevance to politics (see Table OA7). Interviews with media practitioners specializing in international news reporting further confirmed that the war on Iraq did not constitute a sensitive topic.[12] Therefore, articles related to Iraq provided reporters with an opportunity to report bout the US without much constraint by the Propaganda Department.

Table OA7. Frequencies of Articles related to Iraq in 2003. Source: USCATA.

		People's Daily	**Beijing Evening News**	Percentage (Total N)
Political Leaders	*China and US*	40	25	16.8 % (65)
	Only US	112	80	49.7 % (192)
No Political Leaders	*China and US*	20	25	11.6 % (45)
	Only US	36	48	21.9 % (84)
Percentage (Total N)		54.3 % (208)	46.1 % (178)	386

Did reporters really use the war on Iraq to express greater criticism of the United States? Results from a multivariate probit regression analysis show that reporters do indeed become more likely to report about Iraq in 2003 compared to 1999. In 1999, the Beijing Evening News is about 10 percent likely to report about Iraq (holding sensitivity at the time and article length constant at average levels), but in 2003 the likelihood increases to 30 percent. The People's Daily is slightly more likely to report about Iraq in

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[11] This pattern is the same across years (1999 and 2003) and newspaper types (People's Daily and Beijing Evening News).

[12] See also section on measurement validity testing for sanctioned and nonsanctioned topics.

both years, though there is some evidence that it may have increased slightly more from 12 percent to about 35 percent.[13] Both papers tended to publish more stories about Iraq in 2003.

Table OA8. Multivariate Probit Regression Results on Selection of Reports on Iraq. Source: USCATA.

	Dependent Variable **Selection of a Story related to Iraq**	
	Coefficient (s.e.)	
People's Daily	0.162** (0.078)	0.076 (0.115)
2003	0.727*** (0.063)	0.665*** (0.087)
People's Daily*2003	--	0.13 (0.127)
Sensitivity Over Time	1.090*** (0.255)	1.105*** (0.256)
Length	0.686 (0.571)	0.722 (0.573)
Constant	-1.513*** (0.071)	-1.476*** (0.079)
N	2,272	2,272
Pseudo R2	0.08	0.08

z-value * z<0.1; ** z< 0.05; *** z< 0.01;

Did reporting about Iraq allow newspapers to report negatively about the United States? Figures OA5a and OA5b demonstrate that the reporting about the United States in

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[13] The interaction term is not statistically significant, but when a dummy variable for the People's Daily is entered without letting it interact with year, it is statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level.

the context of Iraq has been consistently more negative than when unrelated to Iraq. This is particularly the case in 2003: in 1999, the tone of news reporting about the US did not differ much depending on whether Iraq was mentioned or not in the Beijing Evening News, but in 2003 the ratio of positive to negative words decreased by 44 percent, which was statistically significant at the 95 percent confidence level. By contrast, the People's Daily did not sharpen its tone, though it did become more likely to report about Iraq, just as the Beijing Evening News.

The combination of increased selection and negative tone illustrates that reporting about Iraq contributed to an increasingly negative tone in Chinese newspapers. Since the war on Iraq was not highly politically sensitive, it provided an opportunity to express criticism in a fashion that was not sanctioned by Propaganda authorities. The motives of the Propaganda officials for allowing Chinese media to express anti-foreign sentiment on some topics and in some situations, but not in others are still debated among scholars. Arguments range from fear that outraged nationalists may turn against the regime if not allowed to express their anger and strategic use of protests to increase audience costs in international relations (Weiss, 2008; Reilly, In press). With respect to the war on Iraq, the authorities initially did not give permission for an anti-War demonstration in Beijing, but eventually gave in (Weiss, 2008). Chinese reporters were also allowed to report live about the war in Iraq, which became a big media event (Interviews # 16, 25). The precise motives behind these decisions are difficult to assess, but would be fruitful to explore in future studies.

Figure OA5. Changes in the Tone of News Reporting Over Time as News Reporting on Iraq Changes. Source: USCATA.[14]

(a - *Beijing Evening News*)

(b - *People's Daily*)

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
[14] Detailed statistical results are presented in Table OA9.

Table OA9. Changes in the Tone of News Reporting Over Time as News Reporting on Iraq Changes. Source: USCATA.

	Dependent Variable **Tone of News Reporting about the US**		
	Coefficient (s.e.)		
	Among All Articles	*People's Daily*	*Beijing Evening News*
Iraq	-0.249**	-0.392**	-0.09
	(0.115)	(0.156)	(0.169)
Iraq * 2003	-0.158	-0.003	-0.424**
	(0.136)	(0.186)	(0.202)
2003	-0.015	0.004	-0.018
	(0.057)	(0.09)	(0.075)
People's Daily	0.286***	--	--
	(0.068)		
Politics	-1.076***	-0.793***	-1.230***
	(0.196)	(0.288)	(0.267)
China and the US	0.379***	0.267***	0.464***
	(0.054)	(0.081)	(0.072)
Sensitivity Over Time	-0.810***	-1.088***	-0.258
	(0.221)	(0.277)	(0.362)
Length	0	0	0
	(0)	(0)	(0)
Constant	0.368***	0.682***	0.337***
	(0.068)	(0.137)	(0.087)
N	2,272	945	1,327
R2	0.08	0.08	0.1

p-value * p<0.1;   ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01;

The Role of Xinhua News Reports

Newspapers are somewhat dependent on reports by the Xinhua News Agency as a source of information about foreign affairs. Most journalists do not have permanent correspondents abroad. As a result, editors often publish Xinhua News Reports, even when the Propaganda Department has not imposed any restrictions. Yet in an effort to attract readers, many newspapers are writing their own articles based on other sources of information, such as the Internet or the newsletter by the U.S. embassy. In another publication I have shown that the Beijing Youth Daily is less likely than the People's Daily to simply reprint Xinhua reports (Stockmann, 2010). This difference between official and nonofficial papers disputes common assumptions by academics and media practitioners in China that news reporting regarding foreign affairs is tightly controlled by means of the Xinhua News Agency.

The USCATA data demonstrates that Chinese reporters, especially those working for commercialized papers, tend to write their own articles regarding the US. Since the dependent variable is a dummy variable coded one if the article constituted a Xinhua report, I rely on maximum-likelihood estimation of multivariate probit regression analysis.

Results show that newspapers are indeed somewhat dependent on Xinhua reports, especially when reporting about politics and when reporting about the United States only. In 1999 the Beijing Evening News was only about 8 percent likely to choose a Xinhua news report when covering Sino-US relations (for an article average in terms of its length, sensitivity at the time, relation to politics and relation to Chinese politicians). Yet when covering only the US without mentioning China this likelihood more than doubled,

summing up to 19 percent. This finding reveals that reporters are somewhat dependent on Xinhua when China is not involved. Yet despite this dependency, the nonofficial paper still tends to select less Xinhua reports than the People's Daily. In the same year, an article in the People's Daily (average in terms of its length, sensitivity at the time, relation to politics and relation to Chinese politicians) was 37 percent likely to constitute a reprinted Xinhua article when covering Sino-US relations, and 55 percent likely when covering only the United States.[15]

The likelihood to publish Xinhua reports increases substantially as the article mentions more Chinese, American, or international political institutions or politicians in the text, which measures relevance to politics in Table OA10. In 1999, highly politically relevant articles in the Beijing Evening News (but average in terms of its length, sensitivity at the time, and relation to Chinese politicians) are 59 percent likely to be Xinhua reports when covering Sino-US relations, and this likelihood increases to 76 percent when covering the US only. Similarly, highly politically relevant articles in the People's Daily (holding the same variables constant at average levels for the year of 1999) are about 50 percent likely to be Xinhua reports when relevant to China and the US, increasing to 67 percent when only covering the US.[16] These patterns show that newspaper become more similar in their selection of Xinhua reports as articles become more politically relevant.

Overall, newspapers are indeed somewhat dependent on the Xinhua news agency when covering foreign affairs, and this dependency is highest for non-sensitive reports that cover international politics unrelated to China. Nevertheless, there remains a

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[15] All estimated likelihoods are statistically significant at the 95 % confidence level.
[16] All estimated likelihoods are statistically significant at the 90 % confidence level.

significant amount of space for newspapers to publish their own reports, especially when

articles are average with respect to their relation to politics.[17] Next I examine whether this

dependency matters for the tone of news reporting about the United States.

Table OA10. Multivariate Probit Regression Results on Reprinting Xinhua News Reports. Source: USCATA.

	Dependent Variable **Reprinted Xinhua News Reports** *(Dummy Variable)*	
	Beijing Evening News	*People's Daily*
2003	-0.081	0.001
	(0.095)	(0.089)
China and the US	-0.511***	-0.450***
	(0.1)	(0.091)
Number of Chinese Politicians	0.028	0.034
	(0.057)	(0.025)
Politics	2.114***	0.519
	(0.351)	(0.323)
Sensitivity Over Time	5.521***	3.106***
	(0.472)	(0.34)
Length	-5.330***	-4.431***
	(1.227)	(0.8)
Constant	-1.692***	-0.728***
	(0.122)	(0.16)
N	1,327	945
Pseudo R2	0.23	0.13

z-value * z<0.1;   ** z< 0.05;   *** z< 0.01;

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[17] On average, the Beijing Evening News mentions about 8 names of Chinese, American, and international institutions and politicians in an article; the People's Daily about 20.

Does the selection of Xinhua reports matter for the tone of news reporting? Table OA11 demonstrates that the increase of negativity in the news between 1999 and 2003 is roughly replicated when distinguishing between Xinhua reports and non-Xinhua reports. I repeated the multivariate OLS regression analysis that produced results presented in Table 1 (also presented in the left Column of Table OA4), but this time I limited the analysis once to Xinhua articles and once to non-Xinhua articles. Results show that we can observe similar trends among both, Xinhua and non-Xinhua reports, but differences across newspapers types and changes over time become more prevalent when selecting Xinhua reports. As in case of differences in tone between sanctioned and non-sanctioned topics, newspapers try to protect themselves from criticism by the propaganda authorities by systematically selecting more negative Xinhua reports in 2003 compared to 1999. When publishing Xinhua reports editors feel that they are on the safe side as they can point towards another author of the article, when being criticized (Stockmann, 2010). Selectively choosing Xinhua reports constitutes another way in which marketized media disguise their strategies to circumvent press restrictions.

On a final note, the results presented in table OA11 strengthen our confidence that the People's Daily adjusts its position over time. In the OLS regression analysis presented in Table 1 we were 60 percent confident (t = -0.924) that we would retrieve similar findings over repeated samples. Once taking into account differences in strategies when selecting Xinhua report and when writing own articles, this confidence increases to 80 percent (t = -1.377). Still, the People's Daily's drop in the ratio of positive to negative tones between 1999 and 2003 of about 17 percent does not become statistically significant, but we can be more confident that the People's Daily became more negative over time.

Table OA11. Changes in the Tone of News Reporting over Time among Xinhua and Non-Xinhua reports. Source: USCATA.

	Dependent Variable **Tone of News Reporting about the US**	
	No Xinhua *News Report*	*Xinhua* *News Report*
People's Daily	0.181*	0.317*
	(0.105)	(0.172)
People's Daily*2003	0.06	0.206
	(0.127)	(0.207)
2003	-0.088	-0.373**
	(0.071)	(0.169)
China and the US	0.441***	0.380***
	(0.062)	(0.105)
Politics	-1.610***	-0.685*
	(0.229)	(0.353)
Sensitivity Over Time	-0.231	-1.483***
	(0.298)	(0.394)
Length	1.279*	0.403
	(0.753)	(0.91)
Constant	0.390***	0.379**
	(0.079)	(0.159)
N	1,615	657
R2	0.07	0.07

p-value * p<0.1;   ** p< 0.05;   *** p< 0.01;

The Role of the Internet

Undoubtedly, the growth of the Chinese internet had a large impact on traditional media. Editorial senior staff members sometimes argue with Chinese propaganda authorities that news has already broke online and should therefore be reported. Can the increasing negativity in the People's Daily and Beijing Evening News be explained by competition with the Internet rather than commercialized papers?

Figure OA6. Growth of the Internet in China. Source: China Internet Network Information Center (CNNIC).

As displayed in Figure OA6, Internet users have increased from 0.32 percent to about 5 percent between 1999 and 2003. During this time, news reports published online were strikingly similar to those published in commercialized papers since online websites either re-printed articles published by commercialized papers or were managed similar to commercialized papers (Stockmann, 2011). While the rise of the Internet may have contributed to the competitive pressure established papers experienced, its ability to provide a different perspective as a source for news was limited, and it may thus have mostly reinforced competitive pressure originating from commercialized papers.

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